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here are many potential reasons for unem-
ployment, and the observation of unemploy-
ment is surely not sufficient in itself to justify the
conclusion that labour markets are malfunctioning.
But the most widely accepted explanation for high
European unemployment is that European-type
welfare state institutions are an impediment to
economic development because they create fric-
tions leading to sclerosis. If Europe wants to main-
tain its position in the world economy, it is argued,
it needs to change its institutions. The typical line
of reasoning proceeds as follows:
Firstly, it is argued on a theoretical basis that
European welfare state institutions shift the econ-
omy away from Pareto efficiency.
Secondly, it is claimed that US institutions come
closest to the “perfect market model” or “best
practice” and that the economic success of the US
shows the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model.
Thirdly, it is argued that strong coalitions prevent
the implementation of the “necessary” reforms. It
is claimed that, although theoretical analysis shows
what the necessary reforms are, political interests
(rent-seeking coalitions) prevent societies from
adopting these recipes.
Fourthly, it is claimed that a delay in the “neces-
sary” reforms will reduce international competi-
tiveness. Globalised capitalism forces countries to
bring their institutions into line with “best prac-
tice”. Just as it was once thought that competition
between firms would only allow companies con-
forming to “best practice”to survive in the market,
so globalisation will only allow the most efficient
institutional arrangements to survive.
This reasoning depends on many assumptions,
however. Basically, it holds for a perfect market
world but not at all necessarily for the real world,
with all its deviations from the perfect model. It
has been shown that even small deviations from
perfect market assumptions (Akerlof/Yellen 1985)
can create outcomes very different from the per-
fect market equilibrium. Furthermore, market
processes can create sub-optimal outcomes and
macro results which do not fit the preferences of
any (!) individual (Schelling 1978). In this situa-
tion, institutions are necessary in order to achieve
the social and individual optimum. Regulations
clearly limit ceteris paribus the scope for discre-
tionary decisions, but only in the perfect market
model are they simply restrictions and distortions;
in a less perfect environment they may well create
opportunities. For example, works councils may
not only constrain managerial decisions but also
give workers a “voice” and thus improve decision-
making (Hirschman 1970, Freeman/Medoff 1984,
Wolf/Zwick 2002).
Nevertheless, the perfect market model is still the
point of reference in economic policy, and many
“political economy” papers (see e.g. Saint-Paul
1996) likewise base their proposals on this model,
albeit appending explanations of the non-imple-
mentation of the “perfect market solution”, usual-
ly based on the interest of “rent-seeking”coalitions
(usually employed insiders or unions) in using
their power to prevent the implementation of per-
fect market solutions and so to protect their rents.
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1 This contribution is an extract from: Schettkat, R. (2002).One Best-Practice Institutional Arrangement? 
Under the conditions of globalised capitalism the
perfect market model predicts that only one “best
practice” can survive.There is such a thing as THE
optimum national institutional arrangement and
ultimately all countries must adopt it. Although
there are no markets for institutions, the selection
process in the stylized economy will only allow
“best practice” to survive. Just as firms with sub-
optimal organizational structures will not survive in
conditions of perfect market competition, so will
international competition in conditions of glob-
alised capitalism require countries with sub-opti-
mal national institutional arrangements to conform
to “best practice”. International competition in a
globalised capitalist economy is thought to impose
the optimum national institutional arrangement on
countries, just as competition within markets
imposes the optimum organizational structure on
firms. In a diagram showing institutional arrange-
ments, ranging from “deregulated” to “regulated”
on the horizontal and economic fitness on the ver-
tical axis, there would be only one peak represent-
ing the “best practice” institutional arrangement
(left-hand diagram in Figure 1).2
The single-peak world is intellectually attractive and
deeply ingrained in economics, perhaps because it
allows for clear and precise policy prescriptions.
Changing institutions in the direction of the “best
practice” institutional arrangement will always
improve economic fitness. All that is necessary is to
identify the leader in terms of economic fitness,
investigate the institutional differences and elimi-
nate them. Policy advice is a risk-free business in the
single-peak world. Once the institutional differences
are identified, the policy prescription is simple:“fol-
low the leader and you improve economic fitness”.
However,there may be more than one peak in the
economic fitness landscape (right-hand panel of
Figure 1).After all,different institutional arrange-
ments may best serve economies specialising in
different kinds of production. Countries may spe-
cialise according to their natural and historical
(path-dependent) advantages. For example, one
country may specialise in medium-tech industries
using a roughly homogeneous labour force with
medium skills, while another country may spe-
cialise in high-tech industries, probably in combi-
nation with a large part of the economy in low-
tech industries. This is roughly the difference
between the German and the US economy, with
the former relying on a “medium-skilled” labour
force and the latter depending on a combination
of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in almost
every industry (Freeman/Schettkat 1999).
International trade may allow the two economies
to achieve a similar level of economic fitness, so
that the fitness landscape will have two peaks
coinciding with different institutional arrange-
ments. In this example, the difference in the insti-
tutional arrangements allows the economies to
achieve similar fitness. Moving one country
towards the institutional arrangement of the other
country would reduce economic fitness,since each
country already has the institutional arrangement
best fitting its structure and resources.
Learning from other countries in a multi-peak eco-
nomic fitness landscape is difficult and policy
advice is hard to give. This world
also requires a very different
approach to international compara-
tive research. It is no longer suffi-
cient to identify the leader and then
mimic the institutional arrangement
of that country. Instead, the rela-
tionship between institutional
arrangements and economic perfor-
mance has to be carefully investigat-
ed to reach an understanding of why
institutions differ and to decide
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Figure 1
2 The metaphor of a “fitness landscape” was
first developed in biology to describe the abili-
ty to survive as a function of genetic code (Bak
1997: 118/119) and was to my knowledge first
introduced into economics by Richard
Freeman (2000).CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 29
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whether they are ideally suited to the structure of
the economy.To identify the impact of institutions
on economic fitness,it is necessary at least to inves-
tigate whether changes in institutions lead to the
assumed effect on economic fitness. Whereas it is
sufficient in a single-peak world to conduct a cross-
country study, the multi-peak world requires at
least the investigation of initial differences and
ideally a “difference in the difference” analysis.
Another complication is the multi-dimensionality
of institutional arrangements, which make them
difficult to identify, and the fact that indicators
intended to summarise institutional arrangements
are always debatable. Furthermore, economic fit-
ness is likewise multi-dimensional and to some
extent debatable. Even though the consensus may
be greater in this respect than with regard to insti-
tutions, it will still be necessary to discuss which
economic aspects are to be included in an eco-
nomic fitness measure, whether they are compa-
tible or competitive (for example, unemploy-
ment and inflation), and how different variables
should be weighted when summarised in a single
indicator. The single-peak vision requires that a
single institutional arrangement be deemed to
be “best practice” in relation to various dimen-
sions of “economic fitness” and different periods
of time.
Many economists may agree to describing econom-
ic fitness in terms of: (1) growth of per capita
income (GDP per capita), (2) productivity growth,
(3) low unemployment,(4) price stability,(5) exter-
nal trade balance and (6) inequality. Leaving the
more controversial inequality aside,Figure 2 shows
“radar diagrams” for the ranking of six big OECD
countries (Germany, France, Italy, UK, US and
Japan) with respect to these economic dimensions
for the averages of the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s
and 1990s.The single-peak vision requires that the
“best practice” country ranks number one in all
dimensions and in all four periods, provided that
there was no very great change in the institutions.
In other words, the best practice country should be
in the centre and country-lines should not cross
each other in the radar diagrams. However,
Figure 2 shows that the country-specific lines do
cross, demonstrating that no country has been the
top performer in all dimensions and over all peri-
ods.The single-peak vision certainly does not hold
when all five dimensions of economic fitness are
included in the analysis.
Japan came closest to being the “single-peak coun-
try” in the 1980s. In that period Japan ranked num-
ber one in 4 of the five dimensions (ranking after
Germany only in export surplus), whereas US per-
formance was average or worse in 4 dimensions of
economic fitness. This explains the popularity of
the Japanese model at that time.Weighting all five
dimensions of economic fitness equally and taking
the mean, Germany ranked number one in the
1960s and remained well ahead of the US up to the
1980s. Only in the 1990s did the US rank number
one on average, and then only in one dimension:
growth of per capita GDP.Apart from this, the US
ranked number one only in terms of low inflation
and that only in the 1960s.
Wage Bargaining: Institutionally Compressed
Wage Distribution? 
“Equal pay for equal work” is the perfect-market
outcome.That means that,controlled for individual
productivity differences and working conditions,
wages are equal across firms and industries.
Allowing for some time to adjust to demand
shocks, such differences may also cause some wage
differences but these should be temporary.
Traditionally, economists have favoured decen-
tralised bargaining because it is closest to the “per-
fect market” model, in which neither the supply
side nor the demand side have any market power
and both are price-takers.Therefore, distortions in
labour markets have usually been identified as the
misuse of market power by unions, classified as
monopolies, pushing up wages and compressing
the wage structure (e.g., Monopolkommission
1994). In addition, high reservation wages (Sinn
1998) or minimum wages can compress the wage
distribution at the low-skill end. Indeed, in a cross-
country comparison, wage differentials decline in
direct linear relation to increasing union density
and other indicators characterizing the bargaining
system such as the degree of centralisation of wage
bargaining institutions. In Table 1 countries are
ranked from left to right according to the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining confirming that
pattern (panel 1, for a more comprehensive analy-
sis Schettkat 2002).
However, these are raw wage differentials and
wage distributions between countries vary for
many reasons. A narrow wage distribution may
indicate institutional wage compression but mayalso be caused by a narrow skill distribution.
Countries with a wide dispersion of skills are
expected to have a wide dispersion of wages and if
countries with decentralised wage bargaining sys-
tems also have wide distributions of skills, conclu-
sions on the impact of institutions on wage disper-
sion drawn from the “raw” wage differentials will
suffer from a spurious correlation.
Panels 2 to 5 display skill ratios derived from the
OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey
(IALS), the first international comparative skill
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survey among the adult population (see OECD
1997).The survey provides skill data based on stan-
dardised literacy scores ranging from 0 to a maxi-
mum of 500. The median skill scores in the IALS
survey for the population in working age (panel 2
in Table 1) do not differ very much between the
US, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands but are
higher for Sweden. The upper end of the skill dis-
tribution also seems to be roughly similar (not dis-
played in Table 1), while the skill distributions at
the lower end of the labour market are clearly dif-
ferent between the US and the continental
European countries, but for the employed the dif-
ference is not so dramatic.
However, according to the hypothesis of institu-
tional wage compression in Europe, the wage com-
pression hypothesis, unions raised wages above the
productivity of the low-skilled workers, which then
caused unemployment among low-skilled workers.
Continental European wage bargaining systems
are alleged to “crowd out” the least skilled work-
ers.Under the “wage compression hypothesis”,one
would therefore expect that the skill score of the
unemployed to be roughly equal to the skill score
of the employed in the US,where the flexible wage
system is claimed to allow low-skilled workers to
price themselves into employment via wage con-
cessions.3 In continental European countries, on
the other hand, the “wage compression hypothe-
sis” would predict a huge gap between the skill
scores of the employed and the unemployed,
because unemployment should be more concen-
trated among the least skilled workers, who are
allegedly pushed out of employment by excessive
minimum wages.The empirical facts are exactly the
reverse of what the wage compression hypothesis
predicts: the median skills of the unemployed are
substantially lower than that of the employed in
the US (88 percent, see panel 4) whereas the medi-
an skills of unemployed in Continental Europe
reaches 95 percent or more of the skills of the
employed.
Because the employed are on average better
skilled than the unemployed (Bell/Nickell 1996,
Freeman/Schettkat 2001) the lower half of the
labour market may be described by the median
skill score of the employed (D5employed) at the
upper bound and the first decile skill score of the
unemployed (D1unemployed) at the lower bound. It
emerges (in line 5 of Table 1) that the median score
for the employed is 2.5 times that of the first decile
of the unemployed in the US, but only about 1.3 to
1.5 times in Germany,Sweden and the Netherlands
(and 1.7 in the UK). These values are much closer
to the D5/D1 ratios for the employed in continen-
tal Europe than they are in the US.
Apparently the wage distribution in the US is also
(but not only, see Schettkat 2002) wider because
the US skill distribution is wider than those in the
continental European countries. Furthermore, the
integrative effect of flexible US wages cannot be
found in the data.The skill differential between the
employed and unemployed is high in the US but
comparatively low in Europe. This is in total con-
trast with the “wage compression hypothesis”,
Table 1
Skills and wages
US UK Germany Netherlands Sweden
1995 1995 1993 1994 1993
1. Wages
D9 / D1 4.39 3.38 2.32 2.59 2.13
D9 / D5 2.10 1.87 1.61 1.66 1.59
D5 / D1 2.09 1.81 1.44 1.56 1.34
Skill (literacy scores)
2.  Population 15-64 years old
     (median)
285 276 285 292 310
3. Employed (median) 292 289 291 300 311
D5 / D1 1.41 1.36 1.22 1.24 1.22
4. Unemployed (median) 257 256 276 289 302
unemployed in % of employed 88 89 95 96 97
D5 / D1 2.14 1.52 1.32 1.44 1.30
5. D5employed / D1unemployed 2.48 1.72 1.39 1.49 1.34
Source: Computations are based on OECD Employment Outlook 1996, p. 62, for wage deciles and IALS for skill
deciles.
3 For an analysis of why “pricing-in”does not occur even in the US,
see Bewley 1995.which alleges that European-type welfare state
institutions exclude low-skilled workers from
employment (see Freeman/Schettkat 2001).
Conclusions
Many welfare state institutions are blamed for
causing labour market inefficiencies and conse-
quently high unemployment in Europe. Closer
inspection reveals,however,that the impact of wel-
fare state institutions on economic performance
and employment is not as clear-cut as some ana-
lysts suggest. At both the theoretical and the
empirical level, the picture is ambiguous, and this
study must conclude that the empirical evidence in
support of the idea that European unemployment
is caused by European welfare state mechanisms is
extremely weak.4 Ranking 20 OECD countries in
terms of the “usual suspects” (i.e. redistribution,
the level of minimum wages, employment protec-
tion, disposable minimum-wage income relative to
net transfers, and net unemployment replacement
rates, for details see Schettkat 2002) and correlat-
ing them with the ranks of the unemployment rates
suggests a very diverse picture (Table 2) more in
line with multi-peak than with the one-peak eco-
nomic fitness landscape.
There are only two significant (at the 10 percent
level) rank correlations in the table. One is
between inequality of market incomes and the
unemployment rate in 1999. Here, however, the
coefficient has a positive sign, meaning that higher
unemployment goes together with higher inequali-
ty. The situation is similar for wage differentials
(D9/D1): again higher wage differentials correlate
positively with unemployment rates in 1980 but not
in other periods. In short, the rank correlations
between institutional variables, which may be
taken to represent the “usual suspects”, do not
show the expected impact on unemployment rates.
For itself, of course, these correlations would be at
best a hint that the deregulationists’ claim of the
negative labour market effects of welfare state
institutions may not hold. However, given the the-
oretical ambiguity and the undetermined empirical
evidence, the correlations in Table 2 may rather be
taken as a summary of the argument: The relation
between welfare state institutions and labour mar-
ket performance is highly complex and deducing
its impact from the perfect market model may be
very misleading.
However, there may be many reasons why the
alleged negative effects of welfare state institutions
are not confirmed in the analysis. First of all, the
indicators used for institutional arrangements are
at best approximations, and it may well be that the
concerted action of institutions creates effects
undiscovered in the analysis of individual institu-
tions (system effects). In general the information
on institutions is weak and for inter-temporal
analysis hardly available. Furthermore, little is
known about the complex interaction of institu-
tions and economic variables, which may in fact
depend on the macroeconomic situation (see
Blanchard/Wolfers 2000). In many analyses this
problem is circumvented by referring to the per-
fect market model. Compared to the perfect mar-
ket situation, any deviation from “perfect market”
institutions is deemed to be a rigidity and the typi-
cal analysis following this approach creates a long
list of such deviations.The message then is to shape
the world according to the perfect market model,
usually ignoring “natural imperfections”.T h e
deregulationists’ view gains its strength from the
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Table 2
Correlation coefficients for country rankings, unemployment rates

























1980 0 0 0 + 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1999 + 0 0 0 0 0 0
* = for a single.
Source: Computations based on OECD countries listed in Schettkat 2002.
4 This result is in line with previous studies, see Schettkat 2002 for
references.CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 33
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theoretical comparison of real world institutions
with the perfect market model, supported by
sketchy empirical examples. If the perfect model
were correct, globalised capitalism would indeed
select the most efficient institutions and countries
would have nothing to choose from. The national
institutions would converge to the one optimal
arrangement. However, real markets suffer from
natural imperfections and many institutions may
have been introduced to compensate for these
imperfections, which also provide freedom for dif-
ferent national institutional arrangements.
It can be concluded that knowledge of the impact
of institutional arrangements on economic vari-
ables needs to be improved and presented in
detailed bi-country studies (e.g.Freeman/Schettkat
2002).There is also a need for a better understand-
ing of “how markets really work”(Gordon 1990) as
it is expressed in the program of many microeco-
nomic studies. However, institutions will always
have many “side-effects”–  both positive and nega-
tive – which will be hard to identify and even hard-
er to quantify.
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